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The personalist conception of probability is often explicated in terms of betting rates acceptable
to an individual. A common approach, that of de Finetti for example, assumes that the individual is
willing to take either side of the bet, so that the bet is ‘‘fair’’ from the individual’s point of view. This
can sometimes be unrealistic, and leads to diﬃculties in the case of conditional probabilities or pre-
visions. An alternative conception is presented in which it is only assumed that the collection of
acceptable bets forms a convex cone, rather than a linear space. This leads to the more general con-
ception of an upper conditional prevision. The main concerns of the paper are with the extension of
upper conditional previsions. The main result is that any upper conditional prevision is the upper
envelope of a family of additive conditional previsions.
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In de Finetti’s exposition [2, p. 87] of the axioms of previsions, judgements of uncer-
tainty are expressed in terms of an individual’s willingness for his or her fortune to be
changed in accordance with an unknown outcome. The discussion is framed in terms of
bets. An individual is obliged to choose, for a random quantity X, a value x ¼ P ðX Þ, with
an associated commitment to accept any bet with gain of the form cðX  xÞ where c is arbi-
trary (positive or negative).
This approach is based on the idea that the price P(X) should be fair. Given a
simple requirement of coherence, it implies that the collection of acceptable bets forms
a linear space, and that P is additive. In practice, however, opinions may not be well
expressed by this conception. There are many bets where an individual might be willing
to take one side, or the other; but there may be no single rate at which there would be
a genuine willingness to take either side of the bet, at the choice of an opponent. That
would imply a greater degree of precision in judgements of uncertainty than is often
realistic.
These notes explore the consequences of assuming that the random quantities, accept-
able to an individual in this sense, form only a cone, rather than a subspace. This leads to a
conception of upper and lower previsions, the former being sub-additive and the latter
super-additive. It also permits a uniﬁed treatment of conditional and unconditional previ-
sions. The principal concern of the essay is with extensions of conditional previsions, and
upper previsions, to larger spaces. The main tool is the result, in Theorem 2, that any
upper conditional prevision is the upper envelope of a family of additive conditional
previsions.
2. Bounds on possible values
2.1. The supremum
Let X be a real linear space of bounded random quantities. For each X 2 X let supX be
the least upper bound of the range of possible values for X. It follows that sup is a real-
valued function satisfying
(S1) sup(X1 + X2) 6 supX1 + supX2 for any X 1; X 2 2 X;
(S2) supaX = a supX for any X 2 X and any real number aP 0;
(S3) supX = infX = 0 implies X = 0 for any X 2 X;where infX = supX. We shall assume, furthermore, that X contains a non-zero
constant quantity:(S4) supX = infX for some non-zero X 2 X.
(S1) and (S2) imply that the set fX 2 X : supX ¼ inf Xg is a linear subspace of X.
(S3) implies that it is no more than one-dimensional; that is to say, all such quantities diﬀer
by no more than a scalar multiple. (S4) and (S2) imply then that there exists an element 1
of X, which is necessarily unique, such that sup1 = inf1 = 1. (We shall usually use the
same symbol for the scalar a and the vector a1. The context will make clear which is
intended.)
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vector ordering of X is deﬁned by writing X1 6 X2 whenever X 1  X 2 2 X6. Similarly,
XP is deﬁned as fX 2 X : inf X P 0g and X1P X2 to mean X 1  X 2 2 XP. It follows
from (S1)–(S3) that XP \X6 ¼ f0g.
2.2. Events
Let E0  X be the set of all elements E 2 X which have 0 and 1 as their only possible
values. We call E ¼ E0  f0g the set of possible events of X. In particular, the sure event
1 2 E, so that the set of possible events is non-empty.
For any E 2 E and X 2 X, let EX denote the random quantity which assumes as its
value the product of the values of E and X whatever happens. Thus EX assumes the value
of X if E occurs, or else the value 0 if E does not occur.We shall assume that EX 2 X when-
ever E 2 E and X 2 X.
On the basis of this informal explanation the reader is invited to accept the following:
(E1) E(X1 + X2) = EX1 + EX2 for any E 2 E and X 1; X 2 2 X;
(E2) E(aX) = aEX for any E 2 E, X 2 X, and any real number a;
(E3) E1 = E for any E 2 E;
(E4) EE = E for any E 2 E;
(E5) E1E2 = E2E1 for any E1; E2 2 E;
(E6) E1(E2X) = (E1E2)X for any E1E2 2 E and X 2 X;
(E7) E1 þ E2  E1E2 2 E for any E1; E2 2 E;
(E8) X 6 0 implies EX 6 0 for any E 2 E and X 2 X;
(E9) supX < 0 implies EX5 0 for any E 2 E and X 2 X.
For any E1; E2 2 E we deﬁne E1 _ E2 = E1 + E2  E1E2. It follows that E1 _ E2 ¼
E2 _ E1 2 E. It is also easy to check that E1 _ (E2 _ E3) = (E1 _ E2) _ E3. Hence we may
write
Wn
i¼1Ei ¼ E1 _    _ En without ambiguity and, furthermore, the summands may be
permuted without altering the sum. We also note that for any E1; . . . ;En 2 E, we have
(E1 _    _ En)Ei = Ei for each i = 1, . . . ,n, and that E  XP.
The consistency of (E1)–(E9), together with the condition that X is closed under the
formation of the product EX, can be established by interpreting X as the linear space
of all real bounded functions on some non-empty set. The requirement that X should
be closed in the way stated is not, strictly speaking, necessary; but it simpliﬁes matters very
considerably. We shall not enter into a discussion of this point except to remark, in case of
misunderstandings, that the purpose of the requirement is to ensure that the value
sup(XjE), to be deﬁned in the next paragraph, is given a meaning for a suﬃciently large
class of random quantities X and events E. On the other hand, conditional previsions will
be deﬁned for arbitrary families of subspaces of X, not necessarily closed under the
product EX.1 That is to say: X6 þX6  X6 and aX6  X6 for any real number aP 0. Generally, for any set S  X, we
shall write lin S for the set of all linear combinations of S and cone S for the set of all positive linear
combinations of S.
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For any X 2 X and E 2 E deﬁne
supðX jEÞ ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2 XPg: ð1Þ
From (E8) and (E9), in particular, it follows that sup(XjE) is always ﬁnite. In our discus-
sion below we shall need to employ many properties of the conditional supremum. Since
they all have a very clear intuitive meaning and validity, we shall not trouble to prove, or
even state them here. The reader may care to check that any particular property required is
in fact derivable from this deﬁnition together with (S1)–(S4) and (E1)–(E9). The meaning
of sup(XjE) is, of course, that of the least upper bound of the range of possible values of X
that can occur consistently with E.
For any possible event E 2 E, we deﬁne RðEÞ ¼ fX 2 X : EX ¼ Xg. This is a linear
subspace of X consisting of those random quantities X 2 X which already vanish if E does
not occur. It is naturally isomorphic to the quotient space obtained by identifying any two
random quantities which can diﬀer only if E occurs. In each subspace RðEÞ we deﬁne the
two cones:
RðEÞ< ¼ fX 2 RðEÞ : supðX jEÞ < 0g;
RðEÞ> ¼ fX 2 RðEÞ : infðX jEÞ > 0g:
Clearly RðEÞ<  X6 and RðEÞ>  XP.
3. Upper and lower conditional previsions
3.1. Cones of acceptable outcomes
Let A be a cone in X satisfying these two conditions:
(C1 0) RðEÞ> A for any E 2 E;
(C2 0) RðEÞ< \A ¼ ; for any E 2 E.
A is intended to represent the random quantities which are ‘‘acceptable’’ to some individ-
ual, i.e. those in accordance with whose outcome he is willing for his fortune to change.2
(C1 0) and (C2 0) express the weakest requirements of ‘‘coherence’’ that are suﬃcient for our
purposes.
Let E0 be any non-empty subset of the set of possible events E and let fXE : E 2 E0g be
any family of subspaces of X (one for each E 2 E0). For each E 2 E0 and X 2 XE deﬁne
P ðX jEÞ ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2Ag: ð2Þ
If X is an event, P*(XjE) is the greatest lower bound of the rates at which the individual is
willing to bet against X at unit stake, conditional on the occurrence of E; that is to say, the
bet is ‘‘called oﬀ’’ if E fails to occur. In the case of a general random quantity X, the reader
will have no diﬃculty in providing an interpretation for the quantity P*(XjE).2 Since any cone corresponds uniquely to a vector ordering of X, we could suppose A to be determined by
means of a ‘‘preference ordering’’ satisfying certain conditions, namely those of a partial order with ‘‘rigidity’’.
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x > sup(XjE) whilst, from (C2 0), Eðx X Þ 62A if x < inf(XjE). Furthermore
Proposition 1. P* satisfies the following condition:
(A*) For any Ei 2 E0, X i 2 XEi and any real numbers aiP 0 (i = 0,1, . . . , n)
sup a0E0ðX 0  P ðX 0jE0ÞÞ 
Xn
i¼1aiEiðX i  P
ðX ijEiÞÞ E0 _
_n
i¼1Ei
 P 0:.Proof. Let us write sup(XjE) for the quantity we have to show to be non-negative and let
K ¼ sup Pni¼0EijE  > 0. Then, for any  > 0,
S0 ¼ a0E0ðP ðX 0jE0Þ  X 0Þ  ð=KÞE0 62A;
Si ¼ aiEiðP ðX ijEiÞ  X iÞ þ ð=KÞEi 2A ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ
in view of the deﬁnition of P* and the fact thatA \ E ¼ ; and E A. SinceA is a cone
it follows that
S ¼ X  ð=KÞ
Xn
i¼0
Ei 62A
because S ¼ S0 
Pn
i¼1Si and assuming S 2A would imply S0 2A, which is false. There-
fore, since S belongs to RðEÞ and RðEÞ> A,
sup X þ ð=KÞ
Xn
i¼0
Ei
E
 !
P 0:
Hence
supðX jEÞP ð=KÞ sup
Xn
i¼0
Ei
E
 !
¼ :
Since this holds for any  > 0, the result follows. hDeﬁnition 1. If P* is a real-valued binary function such that P*(XjE) is deﬁned for every
E 2 E0, X 2 XE and if P* satisﬁes (A*), we call P* an upper conditional prevision on
fXE : E 2 E0g. If E0 ¼ E andXE ¼ X for every E 2 E0, so that P*(XjE) is deﬁned for every
random quantity X 2 X and every possible event E 2 E, we refer to P* as, simply, an upper
conditional prevision on X.
The most immediate example to hand of an upper conditional prevision on X is the
conditional supremum sup(XjE) itself: compare deﬁnitions (1) and (2) and note that XP
satisﬁes (C1 0) and (C2 0).
Any upper conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g satisﬁes the following conditions
whenever all expressions are deﬁned:
(A1*) P*(X1 + X2jE) 6 P*(X1jE) + P*(X2jE);
(A2*) P*(aXjE) = aP*(XjE) for any real number aP 0;
(A3*) P*(XjE) 6 sup(XjE);
(A4*) P*(E1(X  P*(XjE1E2))jE2) = 0.
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be proved below, namely (A4) of Proposition 5. We leave this to the reader. We mention
here four other conditions satisﬁed by any upper conditional prevision which will be useful
later on. They are asserted to hold, of course, only when well-deﬁned. Writing
P*(XjE) = P*(XjE), we have
(A5*) P*(XjE) 6 P*(XjE);
(A6*) EX1 6 EX2 implies P*(X1jE) 6 P*(X2jE);
(A7*) P*(XjE1)P 0 implies P*(E1XjE1 _ E2)P 0;
(A8*) P*(XijEi) < 0 (i = 1, . . . ,n) implies P 
Pn
i¼1EiX i
Wn
i¼1Ei
  < 0.
3.2. Suﬃcient condition for coherence
We now show that satisfaction of condition (A*) is a suﬃcient condition for coherence
in a slightly stronger sense.
Proposition 2. Let P* be an upper conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g. Then there exists
a cone A  X satisfying
(C1) XP A,
(C2) A \X6 ¼ f0g,
and hence a fortiori (C1 0) and (C2 0), such that, for all E 2 E0, X 2 XE,
P ðX jEÞ ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2Ag:Proof. Deﬁne the cone A by
A ¼ coneðfEðx X Þ : E 2 E0; X 2 XE; x > P ðX jEÞg [XPÞ:
ClearlyA satisﬁes (C1). Concerning (C2), suppose X 2A. Then either X 2 XP, in which
case certainly X 62 X6  f0g, or else
X P
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðxi  X iÞ
for some Ei 2 E0, X i 2 XEi , xi > P*(XijEi) and ai > 0 (i = 1, . . . ,n). In that case
sup X
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
P sup
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðxi  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
 Xn
i¼1
aiEiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
_n
i¼1
Ei

!
P inf
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðxi  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
þ sup 
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
P inf
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðxi  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
by ðAÞ
> 0 since each aiðxi  P ðX ijEiÞÞ > 0 for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n:
It follows that X 62 X6.
372 P.M. Williams / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 44 (2007) 366–383It remains to prove that inffx : Eðx X Þ 2Ag ¼ P ðX jEÞ for any E 2 E0 and X 2 XE.
Certainly Eðx X Þ 2A if x > P*(XjE). Conversely, suppose E0ðx X 0Þ 2A where
E0 2 E0 and X 0 2 XE0 . Then either E0ðx X 0Þ 2 XP, in which case xP sup(X0jE0)P
P*(X0jE0), or else
E0ðx X 0ÞP
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðxi  X iÞ
for some Ei 2 E0, X i 2 XEi , xi > P*(XijEi), ai > 0 (i = 1, . . . ,n) where we may assume, with-
out loss of generality, that ai = 1 (i = 1, . . . ,n) in virtue of (A2*). Thus
sup E0ðX 0  xÞ þ
Xn
i¼1
Eiðxi  X iÞ
E
 !
6 0 ð3Þ
where E ¼ E0 _
Wn
i¼1Ei. Setting
a0 ¼ x P ðX 0jE0Þ; Y 0 ¼ E0ðX 0  P ðX 0jE0ÞÞ
ai ¼ P ðX ijEiÞ  xi; Y i ¼ EiðP ðX ijEiÞ  X iÞ ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ
we have
sup
Xn
i¼0
aiEi
E
 !
P sup
Xn
i¼0
Y i
E
 !
 sup
Xn
i¼0
Y i 
Xn
i¼0
aiEi
E
 !
P  sup
Xn
i¼0
Y i 
Xn
i¼0
aiEi
E
 !
by ðAÞ
¼  sup E0ðX 0  xÞ þ
Xn
i¼1
Eiðxi  X iÞ
E
 !
P 0 by ð3Þ:
Since ai < 0 for each i = 1, . . . ,n, it follows that a0P 0 and the proof is complete. h3.3. Alternative characterizations
Proposition 1 has shown that satisfaction of (A*) is a necessary condition for coherence
in the sense of (C1 0) and (C2 0), and Proposition 2 has shown that (A*) is a suﬃcient con-
dition in the stronger sense of (C1) and (C2). By the latter we mean that (A*) implies that it
is possible for the subject to choose to accept or reject quantities in X in a way which
accords with P* and which satisﬁes (C1) and (C2). The deﬁnition of the cone A in the
proof of Proposition 2 shows how this may be achieved.
It is not asserted that the coneA deﬁned there is the unique cone with the desired prop-
erties. It is, however, distinguished in the sense that A is the smallest cone corresponding
to P* which satisﬁes (C1) and (C2). To satisfy (C1 0) and (C2 0), it would be suﬃcient, and
also necessary in order to obtain the smallest such coneA0, to replace XP in the deﬁnition
ofA by fRðEÞ> : E 2 Eg. To see this it is enough to glance through the proof and remem-
ber that A0 A.
In the case where P* is an upper conditional prevision on X,A0 can be described more
concisely by
A0 ¼ conefEX : E 2 E;X 2 X; P ðX jEÞ > 0g:
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P ðEðx X ÞjEÞ ¼ x P ðX jEÞ
for any E 2 E, X 2 X. This simpliﬁcation, however, is not possible in general sinceXE may
be any subspace of X and therefore from the fact that P*(XjE) is deﬁned it cannot be
inferred that P*(E(x  X)jE) is deﬁned.
We can summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 3. For any upper conditional prevision P 0 on fXE : E 2 E0g
P 0ðX jEÞ ¼ inf x : Eðx X Þ 2A00
  ðE 2 E0;X 2 XEÞ;
where
A00 ¼ cone fEðx X Þ : E 2 E0; X 2 XE; x > P 0ðX jEÞg [ fRðEÞ> : E 2 Eg
 
.
The same is true if A00 is replaced by A0 ¼ coneðA00 [XPÞ.
For an upper conditional prevision on X, there is the following simpliﬁcation.
Proposition 4. For any upper conditional prevision P* on X
P ðX jEÞ ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2A0g ðE 2 E; x 2 XÞ;
where
A0 ¼ conefEX : E 2 E; X 2 X; P ðX jEÞ > 0g:
The same is true if A0 is replaced by A ¼ coneðA0 [XPÞ.3.4. Conditional previsions
We have noted in (A2*) that any upper conditional prevision is non-negative homoge-
neous as a function of its ﬁrst argument. If it is fully homogeneous, that is to say
P*(aXjE) = aP*(XjE) for any real number a (positive or negative), then if we write
P(XjE) for the common value P*(XjE) = P*(XjE), it follows that
(A) For any Ei 2 E0, X i 2 XEi and real numbers ai (i = 1, . . . ,n)
sup
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
P 0:This is easily demonstrated using suitable substitutions of X for X in (A*).
Deﬁnition 2. If P is deﬁned on the family fXE : E 2 E0g and satisﬁes (A), we call P a
conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g. If E0 ¼ E andXE ¼ X for every E 2 E0, we refer to
P as, simply, a conditional prevision on X.
Again, by reversing signs, it is easily shown that every conditional prevision is, simul-
taneously, an upper conditional prevision.
Proposition 5. Any conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g satisfies the following conditions
whenever all expressions are defined:
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(A2) P(aXjE) = aP(XjE) for any real number a;
(A3) P(XjE) 6 sup(XjE);
(A4) P(E1XjE2) = P(E1jE2)P(XjE1E2).Proof. The proofs of (A1)–(A3) are straightforward. Concerning (A4) put
X 2 ¼ E1ðX  P ðX jE1E2ÞÞ:
We prove that P(X2jE2) = 0. In fact (A) implies that
sup E1E2ðX  P ðX jE1E2ÞÞ  E2ðX 2  P ðX 2jE2ÞÞ E1E2 _ E2jð ÞP 0:
Noting that the ﬁrst expression is E2X2 and that E1E2 _ E2 = E2, we have
sup(E2P(X2jE2)jE2)P 0 and hence P(X2jE2)P 0. The opposite inequality can be estab-
lished by reversing signs and hence the result follows from (A1) and (A2). hProposition 6. If P is a conditional prevision on X, then (A) is equivalent to (A1)–(A4).Proof. We already know that (A) implies (A1)–(A4). Conversely, if P is deﬁned for all
X 2 X and E 2 E, (A4) implies that
P EiX i
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
¼ P Ei
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
P ðX ijEiÞ
for any X i 2 X, Ei 2 E ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ. It follows from (A1) and (A2) that
P
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
¼ 0
for any real numbers a1, . . . ,an and hence the result follows from (A3). h
If P is only deﬁned on the family fXE : E 2 E0g, (A1)–(A4) are not equivalent to (A).
The diﬃculty is that P may not be deﬁned for suﬃciently many pairs (XjE) for (A4) to be
suﬃciently restrictive. However, as we shall see, (A) is a suﬃcient condition for the exis-
tence of an extension of P to a conditional prevision on the whole of X where (A) and
(A1)–(A4) will be equivalent.
4. Extensions of previsions
The most general question concerning the extensions of conditional previsions with
which we shall deal is the following. Suppose P is a conditional prevision on
fXE : E 2 E0g where E0 is any non-empty subset of the set of possible events E of X
and, for each E 2 E0, XE is a subspace of X. Let E00 be any set of possible events of E such
that E0  E00 and let X0E : E 2 E00
 
be any family of subspaces ofX such thatXE  X0E for
each E 2 E0. Does there exist a conditional prevision P 0 on X0E : E 2 E00
 
which extends
P? If so, what are the bounds on the possible values of P 0(XjE) for any E 2 E00 and
X 2 X0E?
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is a conditional prevision on X, the restriction of P to any family of subspaces
fXE : E 2 E0g of X is a conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g. It follows that in order
to solve the problem just raised it is both necessary and suﬃcient to treat the case of exten-
sions to conditional previsions on X. All our discussion will relate, without loss of gener-
ality, to this case.
4.1. Extensions of upper conditional previsions
The problem of extending upper conditional previsions was eﬀectively solved in Prop-
ositions 3 and 4. For suppose P 0 is an upper conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g. Let
P* be deﬁned for all X 2 X, E 2 E by
P ðX jEÞ ¼ inf x : Eðx X Þ 2A00
 
;
whereA00 is deﬁned as in Proposition 3. Then clearly P
* extends P 0 in virtue of the result
stated there and, furthermore, sinceA00 is a cone satisfying (C1
0) and (C2 0), it follows that
P* is an upper conditional prevision on X. In addition it is clear that if P 0 is any other
upper conditional prevision on X extending P 0, then P
0ðX jEÞ 6 P ðX jEÞ for any
X 2 X, E 2 E. For we know from Proposition 4 that
P 0ðX jEÞ ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2A0g;
where
A0 ¼ cone EX : E 2 E; X 2 X; P 0ðX jEÞ > 0
 
:
Since P 0 also extends P 0, it is clear thatA
0
0 A0 and hence the result follows. In summa-
rizing this discussion we choose to deﬁne P* in terms of the cone A0, in other words we
replace fRðEÞ> : E 2 Eg by XP, since this formulation appears to have more straightfor-
ward applications. Thus we have:
Theorem 1. If P 0 is an upper conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g, then the real-valued
binary function P* defined byP ðX jEÞ ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2A0g ðX 2 X;E 2 EÞ;
where
A0 ¼ cone Eðx X Þ : E 2 E0; X 2 XE; x > P 0ðX jEÞ
  [XP ;
is an upper conditional prevision on X that extends P 0. Furthermore, if P
0 is any other upper
conditional prevision on X that extends P 0, then
P 0ðX jEÞ 6 P ðX jEÞ ðX 2 X;E 2 EÞ:4.2. Upper envelopes
We shall now prove a fundamental relationship between conditional previsions and
upper conditional previsions. The problem of the extensions of conditional previsions will
then be solved as a corollary. We shall formulate this result for the special case of upper
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of generality.
Theorem 2. A real-valued binary function P* is an upper conditional prevision on X if and
only if there exists a non-empty family P of conditional previsions on X such that
P ðX jEÞ ¼ supfP ðX jEÞ : P 2 Pg ðX 2 X;E 2 EÞ:Proof. Suppose P is a non-empty family of conditional previsions on X and let P* be
deﬁned as in the statement of the theorem. Then P*(XjE) is ﬁnite since P(XjE) 6 sup(XjE)
for any X 2 X, E 2 E and P 2 P. Now suppose X i 2 X, Ei 2 E and aiP 0 for
i = 0,1, . . . ,n. Then, for any  > 0, there exists P 2 P such that
a0P ðX 0jE0ÞP a0P ðX 0jE0Þ  
and necessarily
aiP ðX ijEiÞ 6 aiP ðX ijEiÞ ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ:
Since P is a conditional prevision on X, it follows from condition (A) of Deﬁnition 2 that
sup a0E0ðX 0  P ðX 0jE0ÞÞ 
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
E0 _    _ En
 !
P  supðE0jE0 _    _ EnÞ ¼ :
Since this holds for any  > 0, P* is an upper conditional prevision on X.
Conversely, we must prove the existence of such a non-empty family P. Let P* be an
upper conditional prevision on X. Suppose X  2 X, E 2 E and let p be any real number
such that
P ðX jEÞ 6 p 6 P ðX jEÞ:
Our aim is to show that there is a conditional prevision P on X, which is dominated by P*,
and for which P(XjE) = p.
Let U be the set of all pairs hfXE : E 2 Eg; P i such that
(i) fXE : E 2 Eg is a family of subspaces of X and X  2 XE ;
(ii) P(XjE) is deﬁned for each E 2 E, X 2 XE and P(XjE) = p;
(iii) P satisﬁes the following condition:(B) For any Ei 2 E, X i 2 XEi and real numbers ai (i = 1, . . . ,n):P 
Xn
i¼1
aiEiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
E1 _    _ En
 !
P 0:Then U is non-empty. For let fXE : E 2 Eg be deﬁned by
XE ¼
linfX g if E ¼ E;
f0g otherwise
	
and let P be deﬁned on fXE : E 2 Eg by
P ðaX jEÞ ¼ ap
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P ðaEðX   pÞjE _ EÞP 0 ð4Þ
for any real number a and any E 2 E. Note for this that (A4*) implies that
P ðEðaX   P ðaX jEÞÞjE _ EÞ ¼ 0 ð5Þ
for any real number a and any E 2 E. To obtain inequality (4) when aP 0, use the fact
that p 6 P*(XjE) to obtain
ðE _ EÞaEðX   pÞP ðE _ EÞaEðX   P ðX jEÞÞ
and apply ﬁrst (A6*) to this inequality and then (5) to the result. The case a 6 0 is analo-
gous, using the fact that pP P*(X
jE). Hence U is non-empty.
Now let U be partially ordered by deﬁning
hfXE : E 2 Eg; P i^ fX0E : E 2 Eg; P 0

 
if and only if XE  X0E, for every E 2 E, and P 0 extends P. It is clear that any totally
ordered subset of U has an upper bound in U. Hence, by Zorn’s lemma, U has a
maximal element. Let hfXE : E 2 Eg; P i be such a maximal element. We shall show that
XE ¼ X, for each E 2 E, and that P is a conditional prevision on X, dominated by P*.
Suppose therefore, to the contrary, that there exist E0 2 E and X 0 2 X with X 0 62 XE0 .
Now consider the following two conditions on the real number x:
P  E0ðX 0  xÞ 
Xn
i¼1
EiðX i  PðX ijEiÞÞ E0 _
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
P 0 ð6Þ
for any Ei 2 E and X i 2 XEi ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ and
P 
Xm
j¼1
E0j X
0
j  P X 0jjE0j
  
 E0ðX 0  xÞ E0 _
_m
j¼1
E0j

 !
P 0 ð7Þ
for any E0j 2 E and X 0j 2 XE0j ðj ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ. It is not diﬃcult to see that x = inf(X0jE0) sat-
isﬁes (6). For, from (B) and (A7*),
P  
Xn
i¼1
EiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ E0 _
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
P 0 ð8Þ
for any Ei 2 E and X i 2 XEi ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ, and since
E0ðX 0  infðX 0jE0ÞÞP 0;
we obtain the inequality
E0 _
_n
i¼1
Ei
 !
E0ðX 0  infðX 0jE0ÞÞ 
Xn
i¼1
EiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
 !
P E0 _
_n
i¼1
Ei
 !

Xn
i¼1
EiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ
 !
: ð9Þ
Applying (A6*) to (9), it follows from (8) that (6) holds when x = inf(X0jE0). It can be
shown similarly that (7) holds when x = sup(X0jE0). Now it is clear that if x satisﬁes
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from this, together with the fact that (6) and (7) are both individually satisﬁable, that if
there is no number satisfying both, there must exist a real number, x0 say, which is both
too large for (6) and too small for (7). More precisely, there must exist Ei 2 E and
X i 2 XEiði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ such that
P  E0ðX 0  x0Þ 
Xn
i¼1
EiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ E0 _
_n
i¼1
Ei

 !
< 0
and E0j 2 E and X 0j 2 XE0j ðj ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ such that
P 
Xm
j¼1
E0jðX 0j  P ðX 0jjE0jÞÞ  E0ðX 0  x0Þ E0 _
_m
j¼1
E0j

 !
< 0:
It would follow from (A8*) that
P ðX jE0 _ EÞ < 0; ð10Þ
where
X ¼
Xm
j1
E0jðX 0j  P ðX 0jjE0jÞÞ 
Xn
i1
EiðX i  P ðX ijEiÞÞ;
E ¼
_n
i¼1
Ei _
_m
j¼1
E0j:
But since P satisﬁes (B) we know that P*(XjE)P 0. Therefore, according to (A7*),
P*(XjE0 _ E)P 0 which contradicts (10). Consequently, there exists a real number, p0
say, which satisﬁes both (6) and (7).
In that case, let fX0E : E 2 Eg be the family of subspaces of X deﬁned by
X0E ¼
linðXE0 [ fX 0gÞ if E ¼ E0;
XE otherwise
	
and let P 0 be deﬁned on fX0E : E 2 Eg by
P 0ðX þ aX 0jE0Þ ¼ PðX jE0Þ þ ap0
with P 0(XjE) = P(XjE) for E5 E0. Since p0 satisﬁes (6) and (7), and P* is non-negatively
homogeneous and P is linear (both as functions of their ﬁrst arguments), it follows that P 0
satisﬁes (B). Hence hfX0E : E 2 Eg; P 0i 2 U with P 0 being a proper extension of P. This
contradicts the assumed maximality of hfXE : E 2 Eg; P i and hence XE ¼ X for all E 2 E.
It remains to show that P is a conditional prevision on X dominated by P*. The former
follows from the fact that P satisﬁes (B) and P*(XjE) 6 sup(XjE) for all X 2 X and E 2 E.
The latter follows from the fact that
P ðEðX  P ðX jEÞÞjEÞP 0 ðX 2 X;E 2 EÞ
since P satisﬁes (B), whereas
P ðEðX  P ðX jEÞÞjEÞ ¼ 0 ðX 2 X;E 2 EÞ
since P* is an upper conditional prevision. Hence P(XjE) 6 P*(XjE) for any X 2 X and
E 2 E.
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shown P to be non-empty and, furthermore that, for every X 2 X, E 2 E and for every
real number p such thatP ðX jEÞ 6 p 6 P ðX jEÞ;
there exists P 2 P such that P(XjE) = p. Hence
P ðX jEÞ ¼ supfP ðX jEÞ : P 2 Pg
for any X 2 X, E 2 E and, in fact, the limit is always attained. h4.2.1. The axiom of choice
Let us interrupt the discussion at this point to make a remark, and raise a question,
about the use of the Axiom of Choice in the theory of previsions. De Finetti [1] proved
that any unconditional prevision on a spaceX can be extended to a prevision on any larger
space. The proof assumed the Axiom of Choice in the form of the well-ordering principle.
Alternatively, one could employ the Hahn–Banach theorem, since a prevision is any linear
functional dominated by sup, and sup is sublinear, so that the result follows directly.
Although the Hahn–Banach theorem is often proved using an equivalent of the Axiom
of Choice, it is known to follow from the Prime Ideal Theorem, which is strictly weaker
than the Axiom of Choice. In fact the Hahn–Banach theorem is weaker still [3]. Conse-
quently, this part of the theory of unconditional previsions rests on principles weaker than
the Axiom of Choice.
In view of this, it is natural to ask whether Theorem 2 on conditional previsions might
be proved without assuming Zorn’s lemma, which is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice.
For instance, does it follow from the Prime Ideal Theorem?
4.3. Extensions of conditional previsions
We return now to the problem of the extension of conditional previsions. This is eﬀec-
tively solved by Theorems 1 and 2. For suppose that P0 is a conditional prevision on
fXE : E 2 E0g. Then, a fortiori, P0 is an upper conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g
so that, by Theorem 1, P0 can be extended to an upper conditional prevision on X. Let
P* be the dominating extension deﬁned in the statement of Theorem 1, with P0 replacing
P 0, and let P be the family of all conditional previsions on X which it dominates. Accord-
ing to Theorem 2, P is non-empty and is, in fact, exactly the family of all conditional pre-
visions onX that extend P0. For if P extends P0, then by Theorem 1, P(XjE) 6 P*(XjE) for
all X 2 X, E 2 E and hence P 2 P. Conversely, if P 2 P, then for every E 2 E0 and
X 2 XE,
P 0ðX jEÞ ¼ P ðX jEÞ 6 P ðX jEÞ 6 P ðX jEÞ ¼ P 0ðX jEÞ
so that P(XjE) = P0(XjE), in other words P extends P0. Furthermore, it follows from the
proof of Theorem 2 that, for every p such that P*(XjE) 6 p 6 P*(XjE), there exists a mem-
ber P of P, and therefore a conditional prevision on X which extends P0, such that
P(XjE) = p. We can summarize these results as follows:
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there exists a conditional prevision P on X that extends P0 and assigns the value P(XjE) = p
if and only if
supfx : EðX  xÞ 2A0g 6 p 6 inffx : Eðx X Þ 2A0g; ð11Þ
where
A0 ¼ coneðfEðx X Þ : E 2 E0; X 2 XE; x > P 0ðX j EÞg [XPÞ:
The range in (11) is always non-empty.
Theorem 3 also holds if A0 is deﬁned using fRðEÞ> : E 2 Eg in place of XP.
4.4. Extensions of unconditional previsions
We shall consider an important special case of Theorem 3. Suppose P is an uncondi-
tional prevision on X, that is to say a linear functional on X such that P(X) 6 supX for
any X 2 X. We ask the question: is it always possible to extend P to a conditional previ-
sion on X? This is meant in the following sense. Let E0 ¼ f1g and X1 ¼ X. Then the func-
tion deﬁned for any X 2 X by P(Xj1) = P(X) is a conditional prevision on fXE : E 2 E0g.
Is it possible to extend P to a conditional prevision on X?
Theorem 3 asserts that this is always possible and, furthermore, gives the bounds. In
this case
A0 ¼ fX 2 X : P ðX Þ > 0g [XP
since this is already a cone, so that X 2A0 if and only if either P(X) > 0 or X 2 XP. Now
if P(E) > 0, then P(E(x  X)) > 0 for all x > P(EX)/P(E), and P(E(X  x)) > 0 for all
x < P(EX)/P(E). Thus every conditional prevision extending P assigns the unique value
P ðX jEÞ ¼ P ðEX Þ=P ðEÞ
as was to be expected. On the other hand, if P(E) = 0, then P(E(x  X)) = 0 for all x, and
hence Eðx X Þ 2A0 if and only if Eðx X Þ 2 XP. Thus the upper bound is
inffx : Eðx X Þ 2 XPg ¼ supðX jEÞ. Similarly the lower bound is inf(XjE) and any value
between these, including the end points, is admissible. The reader may care to examine the
more general case where the initial prevision P is deﬁned only on a proper subspace of X
to which E does not belong.
5. Linear previsions and coherence
In conclusion it may be interesting to make some remarks comparing the scheme of
‘‘bets’’ employed in Section 3.1 with the scheme ordinarily employed for linear previsions
[2]. For simplicity, we shall restrict attention to the case where the space in question is
closed under the product EX.
5.1. Unconditional previsions
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of unconditional previsions or, equivalently, of previsions
conditioned on the sure event. The most obvious and important diﬀerence is that whereas
we only assume that the classA of acceptable bets is a cone, it is normally assumed to be a
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is left to an ‘‘opponent’’ to choose whether any bet is on or against the quantity in
question.
FurthermoreA is understood to be a hyperplane in X, that is to say a maximal proper
subspace. To see this, notice that from the point of view of either ‘‘coherence’’ or ‘‘strict
coherence’’ (the diﬀerence between these concepts is recalled below) the sure gain 1 does
not belong to A, otherwise the sure loss 1 would also belong. It follows that A is a
proper subspace of X. To see thatA is maximal, notice that for every X 2 X it is assumed
that X  x 2A for some real number x, that is to say X = X0 + x for some X 0 2A and
some real number x. The maximality of A follows straightforwardly from this
observation.
From the point of view of strict coherence an individual should never, ideally, accept a
bet which can only be lost, but never won; more precisely A \X6 ¼ f0g where
X6 ¼ fX 2 X : supX 6 0g. From the point of view of coherence, only those bets from
which the individual is bound to lose at least a certain deﬁnite positive amount, whatever
happens, are excluded: thus A \X< ¼ ; where X< ¼ fX 2 X : supX < 0g.
Thus we may summarize both the assumptions of the underlying scheme of bets and the
two requirements of coherence as follows:
Coherence: A is a hyperplane in X such that A \X< ¼ ;,
Strict coherence: A is a hyperplane in X such that A \X6 ¼ f0g.
We shall not discuss here the intermediate conception of ‘‘weak’’ coherence which excludes
bets from which the individual is bound to lose, though the amount lost might be arbi-
trarily small. Having taken sup as the primitive notion, it is not easy to distinguish this
from strict coherence.
In either case, the prevision P associated with the hyperplane A is the unique linear
functional such thatNðPÞ ¼A and P(1) = 1, whereNðP Þ is the null-space of P deﬁned
byNðP Þ ¼ fX 2 X : P ðX Þ ¼ 0g. To determine P more explicitly, let Y be any member of
X not belonging toA. Then sinceA is a hyperplane, every X 2 X has a unique represen-
tation as X = X0 + pXY for some X 0 2A and some real number pX. In particular the sure
event 1 ¼ X 00 þ p1Y for some X 00 2A, and where p15 0 since 1 62A. P is then obtained
by setting P(X) = pX/p1.
If one wished to select a ‘‘gauge’’ Y which would work for anyA satisfying the require-
ments of either coherence or strict coherence, it would be necessary to choose Y in either
X< orX> since, otherwise, there would always exist a hyperplaneA withA \X< ¼ ; and
Y 2A. A natural choice is the sure event. On the other hand, if one were only concerned
with strict coherence, it would be suﬃcient to choose any non-zero element of either X6 or
XP. For instance, one could choose any possible event E 2 E.
Since, in any case, the prevision associated withA satisﬁesNðPÞ ¼A, it follows that,
in the case of strict coherence, NðP Þ \X6 ¼ f0g and therefore also NðP Þ \XP ¼ f0g.
This means that, according to strict coherence, and assuming the normal scheme of bets,
no random quantity may be assigned a zero prevision unless it can assume both positive
and negative values. In particular, no possible event E 2 E can be assigned a zero
probability.33 The diﬃculties with this conception, and related problems, are richly discussed in de Finetti [2, Chapter 3.11].
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We turn now to conditional previsions. Suppose these are to be determined, relative to
the same hyperplane A, in accordance with the scheme of ‘‘conditional bets’’. That is to
say, for any possible event E, we intend P(XjE) to be the unique value of x, if it exists, such
that EðX  xÞ 2A.
In the case of strict coherence this works well enough, but coherence permits E itself
to belong to A, in which case EðX  xÞ 2A for all x, if EX 2A, and for no x, if
EX 62A. Consequently this approach, as stated, breaks down. At this point we could
follow de Finetti [2, Chapter 4] by considering preferences between quadratic losses.
Instead we shall investigate the consequences of modifying the betting scheme in the spirit
of Section 3.1.
The idea is to relax the requirement that the individual is willing to take either side of an
acceptable bet. Speciﬁcally, we suppose only thatA is a cone. Having removed the require-
ment of homogeneity from A it can nonetheless be imposed directly on P as follows:
Homogeneous coherence: A is a cone in X such that
(C1) XP A;
(C2) A \X6 ¼ f0g;
(C3) supfx : EðX  xÞ 2Ag ¼ inffx : Eðx X Þ 2Ag ðE 2 E;X 2 XÞ.
If we denote the common value of the two expressions in (C3) by P(XjE), this amounts to
the requirement that the individual is willing to bet both on and against X, conditional on
E, at rates arbitrarily close to P(XjE), below in the ﬁrst case and above in the second, but
not necessarily at the same limiting rate both ways. We know from Section 3 that P then
satisﬁes
(A1) P(X1 + X2jE) = P(X1jE) + P(X2jE);
(A2) P(aXjE) = aP(XjE) for any real number a;
(A3) P(XjE) 6 sup(XjE);
(A4) P(E1XjE2) = P(E1jE2)P(XjE1E2).
Conversely, assuming P(XjE) is deﬁned for every X 2 X and E 2 E, then (A1)–(A4) are
suﬃcient for the existence of a corresponding cone A satisfying (C1)–(C3). That is to
say, it is always possible for the individual to choose whether to bet at the extreme rates,
or only arbitrarily closely, in such a way that no bet is accepted that can only be lost.
All this applies, with suitable modiﬁcations, to the simpler case of unconditional previ-
sions and probabilities. In particular, in order to ensure strict coherence, in the sense that
A \X6 ¼ f0g, it is not necessary, from the point of view of the present scheme of bets, to
impose any requirements other than that P should be a linear functional such that always
P(X) 6 supX.
5.3. Upper and lower conditional previsions
Once A is no longer required to be a subspace but only a cone, the requirement of
homogeneity (C3) is not so obviously justiﬁed. Instead we should distinguish between
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P ðX jEÞ ¼ supfx : EðX  xÞ 2Ag:
(C1) and (C2) are nonetheless suﬃcient to establish
(A1*) P*(X1 + X2jE) 6 P*(X1jE) + P*(X2jE);
(A2*) P*(aXjE) = aP*(XjE) for any real number aP 0;
(A3*) P*(XjE) 6 sup(XjE);
(A4*) P*(E1(X  P*(XjE1E2))jE2) = 0.
Similar conditions hold for P* as a consequence of the identity P*(XjE) = P*(XjE).
Conversely, assuming P*(XjE) is deﬁned for every X 2 X and E 2 E, (A1*)–(A4*) are suf-
ﬁcient for the existence of a corresponding cone A satisfying (C1) and (C2).
Assuming that we are not back with the homogeneous case P* = P
* we are dealing with
a new situation which has no parallel in the ordinary scheme of bets. In an earlier paper [6]
this was interpreted as the case of an individual whose opinions, on at least some ques-
tions, are not precisely determined, and this must surely be the general case. It has been
shown here, however, that for any upper conditional prevision P* there exists a family
P of conditional previsions P such that
P ðX jEÞ ¼ supfP ðX jEÞ : P 2 Pg ðE 2 E;X 2 XÞ
and indeed that, for any X 2 X, E 2 E and any real number p such that
P*(XjE) 6 p 6 P*(XjE), there exists a P 2 P such that P(XjE) = p. This means that, in
the case of indeterminacy, the opinions may be represented precisely by a family of addi-
tive conditional previsions.
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